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INTRODUCTION
Professor Thomas B. Colby’s In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty
Principle comprehensively examines the underpinnings of the
Supreme Court’s landmark Shelby County v. Holder1 decision, which
found one portion of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to impermissibly
differentiate between states in violation of the equal sovereignty
doctrine.2 Professor Colby also described the potential applicability of
Shelby County to other federal statutes that treat states differently.3
One of the impacted laws discussed by Professor Colby—and Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her Shelby County dissent—is the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).4 PASPA is the subject
of litigation currently pending at the Supreme Court.5 PASPA acts as
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1. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Shelby County extended the equal
sovereignty doctrine as set forth four years earlier in Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
2. See generally Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1087 (2016).
3. Id. at 1154–59.
4. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).
5. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en
banc) [hereinafter Christie II]; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730
F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) [hereinafter Christie I]. New Jersey’s
certiorari petition in Christie II was pending in the Supreme Court as of June 22, 2017. See Petition
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a ban on state-sponsored sports gambling nationwide,6 but it exempts
Nevada and at least eight other states from its scope via a perpetual
grandfathering clause.7 PASPA’s state-level differentiation is
effectuated despite the fact that its text does not specify, by name, the
states exempted from its blanket sports betting ban.8
In light of Shelby County, Professor Colby posited that “statutes
like PASPA are constitutionally questionable.”9 We agree.
We respond to Professor Colby and explain that the argument
against PASPA on equal sovereignty grounds is even stronger than he
described. With citations to PASPA’s legislative history and a
discussion about the permissibility of permanent grandfather clauses
under Shelby County, we extend Professor Colby’s analysis to the
ongoing sports-betting dispute between New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie and five sports leagues—the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), National Football League (NFL), National
Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and
the Office of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball (MLB). The
five sports leagues (“Plaintiff Sports Leagues”) have twice sued
Governor Christie under PASPA to prevent New Jersey from
legalizing Nevada-style sports gambling.10 The two cases are commonly

for Writ of Certiorari, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Association, Nos. 16-476 & 16-477
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).
6. § 3702.
7. § 3704.
8. See §§ 3701–04.
9. Colby, supra note 2, at 1091.
10. Prior to PASPA’s enactment in 1992, individual members of the Plaintiff Sports Leagues
filed lawsuits against two other states in connection with sports gambling. First, the NFL and its
twenty-eight member teams sued the Governor of Delaware in 1976 to stop the state from
offering a football-themed lottery. Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372,
1379 (D. Del. 1977) (“[T]here is the overwhelming evidence already reviewed that, in actual
experience, widespread gambling, both illegal and state-authorized, has not hurt the NFL.”).
Second, the NBA sued Oregon in 1989 over the state’s “Sports Action” contest operated by the
Oregon Lottery. Complaint, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Or. State Lottery, No. 89-6470 (D. Or. Dec.
21, 1989). See NBA Files Suit Against Oregon Lottery, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1989), http://
articles.latimes.com/1989-12-22/sports/sp-792_1_oregon-lottery [https://perma.cc/Y3S9-W7HQ].
Nevada-style sports wagering refers to the broadest legal offering of sports wagering contests in
the United States including odds, totals, money line, and point spread betting, as well as betting
on individual or combinations of games in the form of parlay bets. See generally Sports Betting,
VEGAS.COM, https://www.vegas.com/gaming/gaming-tips/sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/4DD
B-URMY].
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referred to as Christie I and Christie II. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled against New Jersey in both.11
In her Shelby County dissent, Justice Ginsburg asked whether
PASPA would “remain safe given the Court’s expansion of equal
sovereignty’s sway.”12 We answer in the negative. PASPA’s
discrimination between the states under the Commerce Clause fails
both the heightened scrutiny standard of geography-based differential
treatment under Shelby County and the lower standard found in the
rational basis test typically used in Commerce Clause cases. Congress’s
justification in treating states differently under PASPA was—and is—
irrationally related to exemptions granted to Nevada, Delaware,
Oregon, Montana, and no fewer than five other states.13 As such, we
are in accord with Professor Colby’s conclusion that “it is highly
questionable whether such a justification can be found” for PASPA’s
unequal treatment among the states.14
Beyond Professor Colby’s PASPA-specific discussion and Justice
Ginsburg’s PASPA-related inquiry, our probe into the dubious
constitutionality of PASPA is also motivated by the Supreme Court’s
PASPA observation 18 years ago in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Association v. United States.15 Justice Stevens, in a unanimous decision,
wrote that PASPA’s exemptions derived from “obscured
Congressional purposes.”16 Even Professor Leah M. Litman, whose
academic analysis runs counter to Professor Colby’s work in several
respects, acknowledged that “the Third Circuit had a somewhat
puzzling explanation for why it rejected an equal sovereignty
challenge” in Christie I.17

11. New Jersey’s petition for a writ of certiorari in Christie I was denied in 2014. See supra
note 5. New Jersey’s Christie II petition for a writ of certiorari was pending as of June 22, 2017.
See supra note 5.
12. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A day after Shelby
County was decided, one of the Third Circuit judges noted the relevance of Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in the course of questioning counsel for the DOJ during oral argument in Christie I: “On
the other hand Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, the first statute she mentioned as perhaps being
implicated by this [equal sovereignty] doctrine is PASPA.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 61,
Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714 & 13-1715).
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Colby, supra note 2, at 1156.
15. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
16. Id. at 179.
17. Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1210 n.21 (2016).
Litman argues that the equal sovereignty doctrine was judicially invented “to justify independent
determinations about federalism.” Id. at 1207.
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We agree with Professor Colby’s broad discussion of the equal
sovereignty doctrine vis-à-vis PASPA but also contend that he did not
go far enough. We likewise agree with the pointed PASPA
observations of Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens, and Professor
Litman. Our response here stretches the findings of each, pinpointing
how the Supreme Court should address the issue if certiorari is granted
in Christie II and PASPA’s constitutionality is evaluated under an
equal sovereignty lens. Part I details PASPA, and Part II summarizes
the long-running New Jersey sports betting litigation. Part III outlines
the equal sovereignty doctrine arguments furthered by the litigants.
Part IV applies the principles of Shelby County to PASPA, concluding
that one portion of PASPA—the exemption of certain states through
a permanent grandfathering clause—runs afoul of the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty.
I. OVERVIEW OF PASPA
PASPA got off to a rough start before it was even enacted. In 1991,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) “oppose[d] enactment of [PASPA]
as drafted.”18 During a 1991 PASPA Congressional hearing,
Representative Mazzoli said: “My reaction is that we’re trying to close
the barn door here after it’s already been opened and a great many of
the horses have escaped. I just don’t know whether we can corral those
horses and put them back in the barn.”19 Since then, PASPA has been
described as “an unusual statute,”20 an “oddity,”21 “Orwellian,”22

18. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 2 (Sept. 24, 1991) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The [DOJ] is concerned that, to the extent that [PASPA] can be
read as anything more than a clarification of current law, it raises federalism issues. It is
particularly troubling that [PASPA] would permit enforcement of its provisions by sports
leagues.”).
19. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 92 (1991)
(statement of Rep. Mazzoli).
20. Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie et al. at 9, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714 & 13-1715).
21. John T. Holden, Anastasios Kaburakis & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Sports Gambling
Regulation and Your Grandfather (Clause), 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 8 (2014).
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 799
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568 & 14-4569). See infra note 93.
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“peculiar and vague,”23 and “facially unprecedented.”24 PASPA’s
legislative history has fared no better. Two years before the
commencement of Christie I, the Plaintiff Sports Leagues described the
legislative history pertaining to PASPA’s exemptions as “undeniably
muddled” and “internally inconsistent,” in PASPA-driven litigation
against the Governor of Delaware.25 Tellingly, the DOJ and one of the
Christie I Third Circuit judges do not even agree on whether PASPA
regulates sports betting. In 2009, the DOJ posited that “Congress
enacted PASPA . . . intending to further regulate interstate sports
gambling.”26 In contrast, the dissenting judge in Christie I wrote:
“PASPA provides no federal regulatory standards or requirements of
its own.”27 Against this backdrop, we outline PASPA’s text and the
legislative history behind its exemptions for certain states.
A. PASPA’s Text
PASPA § 3702 makes it unlawful for state governments to
“sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by
law . . . [a] betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on one or
more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate . . . or on one or more performances of such athletes in such
games.”28 PASPA’s prohibition also attaches to sports betting offered
by a private entity acting pursuant to “law or compact of a government
entity.”29 PASPA provides civil injunctive relief only, with both the
DOJ and “a professional sports organization or amateur sports

23. MASS. GAMING COMM’N, WHITE PAPER ON DAILY FANTASY SPORTS, at iv (Jan. 11,
2016), http://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/MGC-White-Paper-on-Daily-Fantasy-Sports1-11-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZHD-GBYY].
24. I. Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling: With Federal
Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 687 (2012).
25. Brief in Opposition at 17, Markell v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 559 U.S. 1106
(2010) (No. 09-914), cert. denied.
26. Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Governor Jon S. Corzine’s Motion to Intervene at
1, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-1301, 2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J.
Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter iMEGA].
27. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 246 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (“PASPA stands
alone in telling the states that they may not regulate an aspect of interstate commerce that
Congress believes should be prohibited.”). Judge Vanaskie continued: “[T]here is no federal
regulatory or deregulatory scheme on the matter of sports wagering. Instead, there is the
congressional directive that states not allow it.” Id. at 245 n.3 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
28. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012). PASPA does
not specifically define “sports gambling” in § 3701’s definition section. See id. § 3701.
29. § 3702(2).
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organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such
violation” statutorily deputized to initiate a lawsuit.30
In § 3704, there is a multi-pronged exception to PASPA’s general
ban on state-sponsored sports betting.31 First, parimutuel animal racing
and jai-alai games are completely exempted.32 Second, New Jersey was
provided a one year period to legalize sports gambling and, in turn,
escape PASPA’s prohibition.33 Finally, PASPA also includes a
grandfathering scheme that differentiates states on two levels: (i)
between exempt and non-exempt states, and (ii) among the sub-classes
of exempted states, with some exempt states more constrained than
other exempt states.34 PASPA § 3704(a)(1) exempts any state-run
sports lottery “to the extent that the scheme was conducted . . . at any
time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August
31, 1990.”35 PASPA § 3704(a)(2) carves out any sports gambling
scheme that was “authorized by statute as in effect on October 2, 1991
[and] actually was conducted . . . at any time during the period
30. § 3703. In Christie II, the Third Circuit sitting en banc misstated this portion of PASPA.
The majority wrote: “[PASPA] includes a remedial provision that permits any sports league
whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the
gambling.” 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (emphasis added). The future tense phrase
“or will be” is not part of § 3703’s text, which only includes the present tense “is.” § 3703.
31. § 3704(a).
32. § 3704(a)(4).
33. § 3704(a)(3). The carve-out would have attached to Atlantic City, a municipality in New
Jersey. New Jersey did not pass such a law by the cut-off date. See Joseph F. Sullivan, How Politics
Nipped a Sports Betting Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/02/
nyregion/how-politics-nipped-a-sports-betting-bill.html [https://perma.cc/PJ5S-9UKB].
Relatedly, the NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB formally intervened in a post-PASPA legal case where
the court found that the New Jersey Casino Control Commission “ha[d] no constitutional or
statutory authority to authorize sports betting.” In re Petition of Casino Licensees, 268 N.J. Super.
469, 470 (1993). The fact that Congress opted to include a potential carve-out for a municipality—
as opposed to an entire state—is noteworthy to the extent that other localities could claim to be
exempt “sanctuary cities” under PASPA. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-601–653 (2017)
(permitting “any county, city, or village to conduct a lottery for community betterment
purposes”). Beyond issues of state and local sovereignty, there is also the related issue of possible
exemptions under PASPA for Indian tribes. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10 (1991) (“An Indian
tribe may conduct, and may allow to be conducted, on lands of the tribe in a State, only those
particular sports gambling schemes that were in operation on such lands prior to August 31,
1990.”).
34. §§ 3704(a)(1)–(2). Former NBA executive David Stern described the practical impact
of these exemptions: “[T]here’s a federal statute that gives [Nevada] a monopoly of types.” See
Ian Thomsen, Weekly Countdown: Stern Open to Legalized Betting, Rule Changes, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 11, 2009), https://www.si.com/more-sports/2009/12/11/weekly-countdown
[https://perma.cc/6VM4-9ZJF].
35. § 3704(a)(1). PASPA’s Senate Report suggested that this exemption attaches to
Delaware and Oregon. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10 (1991).
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beginning September 1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991.”36 PASPA’s
state-specific grandfathering scheme makes no mention by name of the
state(s) actually covered by any of the exemptions. Such ambiguity has
fostered confusion about the statute’s scope for 25 years, stretching
from PASPA’s inception to the Supreme Court’s pending review of
New Jersey’s petition for a writ of certiorari in Christie II.
Prior to the New Jersey sports betting litigation in Christie I and
Christie II, PASPA was the subject of litigation three times. In Flagler
v. United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, the district court
dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiff failed
to provide the court any “explanation of how a right to gamble on
professional and amateur sports would be or could be a ‘legally
protected right.’”37 In iMEGA, the district court similarly dismissed the
plaintiffs’ PASPA-related claims for lack of standing.38 In Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell, the Third Circuit ruled against
Delaware—one of PASPA’s exempted states—in its attempt to offer
single-game betting on various sports.39 The court concluded: “[A]ny
effort by Delaware to allow wagering on athletic contests involving

36. § 3704(a)(2). PASPA’s Senate Report suggested that this exemption attaches to Nevada.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10 (1991).
37. See iMEGA, No. 09-1301, 2011 WL 802106, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (citing Flagler v.
United States Attorney for the Dist. of N.J., No. 06-3699, 2007 WL 2814657, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Sept.
25, 2007)). Interestingly, New Jersey Governor Christie was the U.S. Attorney in Flagler. See
Letter from Christopher J. Christie, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of N.J., to the Honorable Joseph A.
Greenaway Jr., U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of N.J. 2 (Feb. 20, 2007) (on file with authors) (“[PASPA]
did not affect States that had already legalized sports betting, including Nevada, Oregon, and
Delaware.”).
38. 2011 WL 802106, at *1. While iMEGA was decided on standing grounds, the case
included the first substantive discussion of PASPA by the DOJ since the DOJ’s 1991 letter to
Congress. See generally Letter from W. Lee Rawls, supra note 18.
39. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
559 U.S. 1106 (2010). The Markell case did not address the equal sovereignty doctrine directly.
Tangentially, the litigants did argue over the relative importance of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 460–61 (1991), and whether its “plain-statement rule” impacted state sovereignty. The
Plaintiff Sports Leagues opined that “the application of the plain-statement rule would not change
the outcome because [PASPA’s statutory text] is unambiguous.” Brief in Opposition, supra note
25, at 16. In contrast, Delaware positioned Gregory to require “Congress to make ‘unmistakably
clear’ its intent to constrain the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers.’” Reply Brief at 1, Markell,
559 U.S. 1106 (No. 09-914) (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61), cert. denied. Delaware also
argued: “The Third Circuit’s cramped interpretation of Congress’s reservation of State authority
cannot be reconciled with Gregory and its progeny.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Markell,
559 U.S. 1106 (No. 09-914), cert. denied.
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sports beyond the NFL would violate PASPA.”40 Christie I was “the
first case addressing PASPA’s constitutionality.”41
B. Impetus for PASPA
The “purpose of [PASPA] is to prohibit sports gambling
conducted by, or authorized under the law of, any State or other
governments.”42 As explained by PASPA’s Senate Report: “Sports
gambling is a national problem. The harms it inflicts are felt beyond
the borders of those states that sanction it. The moral erosion it
produces cannot be limited geographically.”43 Representative Bryant
referenced “the deeply corrosive effect of sports gambling
nationwide.”44 According to Senator Hatch, “the bottom line is this:
sports gambling is bad for the country. . . . [PASPA] is an important
bill. We should not weaken it. We should not create loopholes in it.”45
Representative Brooks mentioned another element: “The purpose of
this legislation is to stop the spread of legalized gambling on sporting
events.”46 The Third Circuit was in accord: “PASPA’s purpose is to
‘stop the spread of State-sponsored sports gambling.’”47 There was also
40. Markell, 579 F.3d at 304. (“[E]xpanding the very manner in which Delaware conducts
gambling activities to new sports or to new forms of gambling—namely single-game betting—
beyond ‘the extent’ of what Delaware ‘conducted’ in 1976 would engender the very ills that
PASPA sought to combat.”). Notably, the five plaintiffs in Markell are the same quintet making
up the Plaintiff Sports Leagues in both Christie I and Christie II.
41. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d Cir. 2013). Indeed, “Markell did not involve a challenge
to the constitutionality of PASPA.” See iMEGA, 2011 WL 802106, at *5 n.2.
42. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991). The Third Circuit elaborated: “PASPA’s text and
legislative history reflect that its goal is more modest—to ban gambling pursuant to a state
scheme—because Congress was concerned that state-sponsored gambling carried with it a label
of legitimacy that would make the activity appealing.” Christie I, 730 F.3d at 237; see also Will
Green, The Scope of PASPA: Parsing the Intent of the Federal US Sports Betting Law, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Nov. 23, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/12205/paspa-scope-andintent-us-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/J277-N3KL].
43. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5. Christie I quoted this portion of the Senate Report with
approval. 730 F.3d at 216. New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley explained further in a law review
article: “Congress has undertaken the task of preventing what many members rightfully deem to
be an evil affecting the nation at large. . . . [T]he Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that
sports betting is a national problem.” See Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act—Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 5,
8–9 (1992).
44. See Jason Goldstein, Take the Money Line: PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the
Integrity of the Game, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 368 (2011) (quoting 137 CONG. REC. E41
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bryant)).
45. 138 CONG. REC. 12,974 (1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
46. 138 CONG. REC. 32,438 (1992) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
47. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 216 (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991)).
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a “concern for ‘the integrity of, and public confidence in, amateur and
professional sports.’”48
Congress made clear that the coverage of § 3702’s general
prohibition on sports gambling was intended to be broad: “The
prohibition of [§] 3702 applies regardless of whether the scheme is
48. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991)). The Plaintiff Sports Leagues claimed that
“PASPA is also part and parcel of Congress’ efforts to protect [their] interstate activities.
Congress viewed respondents’ sporting events as important interstate activities well worth
protecting and viewed the spread of state-sponsored gambling as a threat to those games.” Brief
in Opposition at 34, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. 16-476 & 16-477 (U.S. Dec.
14, 2016). Whether Plaintiff Sports Leagues are injured by legalized sports gambling remains a
contentious issue. Before the issue was litigated in Christie I and Christie II, it arose in the Markell
case. The Plaintiff Sports Leagues argued that the district court “simply does not have discretion
to override the express findings by Congress that violation of PASPA will cause harm to plaintiffs
and the public.” Letter from Kenneth J. Nachbar, Counsel for Plaintiffs, to the Honorable
Gregory M. Sleet, U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of Del. 10 (Aug. 3, 2009) (on file with authors). Delaware
countered with: “The ties between sports teams and gambling interests are long-standing, and
long have been recognized as mutually beneficial.” Appellees’ Answering Brief in Opposition to
Appellants’ Appeal of the Denial of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 46, Office of
the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-3297). In Markell, the
district court concluded: “[T]he court is not certain that the plaintiffs have demonstrated
irreparable harm.” Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, No. 09–538, 2009 WL 2450284,
at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 10, 2009). For mainstream treatment of this issue, see Steve Fainaru, Paula
Lavigne & David Purdum, Betting on the Come: Leagues Strike Deals with Gambling-Related
Firms, ESPN.COM (Jan. 28, 2016), http:/a/www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/14660326/nba-nflmlb-nhl-striking-various-business-deals-gambling-related-firms [https://perma.cc/RJ9F-BASQ];
James Glanz, Agustin Armendariz & Jacqueline Williams, N.F.L.’s Deal Over Data Blurs a Line
on Gambling, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/sports/
sportradar-nfl-gambling.html [https://perma.cc/MHA2-UU5U]; Dustin Gouker, NBA Commish,
NHL Owner Bullish on ‘In-Game’ Sports Betting in U.S.?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 30, 2015,
5:00 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/1256/nba-commish-nhl-owner-bullish-on-in-gamesports-betting-in-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/8TDM-H2DY]; James Herbert, Silver: Gambling ‘Good
for Business, I Don’t Want to Hide from That,’ CBSSPORTS.COM (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.cbs
sports.com/nba/news/silver-gambling-good-for-business-i-dont-want-to-hide-from-that/ [https://
perma.cc/XJJ7-LPMU]; Chad Millman, Harm of Betting to Leagues Remains Unclear, ESPN.COM
(Mar. 1, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://www.espn.com/insider/blog/_/name/millman_chad/id/9002204/
betting-new-jersey-ruling-harm-betting-sports-leagues-remains-unclear [https://perma.cc/5GED7ZWQ]; David Purdum, More Gambling Doesn’t Up Fixing, ESPN.COM (Nov. 14, 2014), http://
www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/11874940/betting-why-legalizing-gambling-increase-match-fixing
[https://perma.cc/25EW-33GT]; ‘Standing’ Up For the Federal Sports Betting Ban: New Quotes
From NBA, NFL Execs Could Impact Cases Beyond New Jersey, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 4,
2017, 9:28 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/13596/nfl-nba-and-sports-betting-case/ [https:
//perma.cc/ZDZ3-L4SX]. For academic discussions of this issue, see Nick Burkhart & Dylan
Welsh, The Legalization of Sports Gambling: An Irreparable Harm or the Beginning of
Unprecedented Growth?, 21 SPORTS L.J. 145 (2014); Brad R. Humphreys, Rodney J. Paul &
Andrew P. Weinbach, Consumption Benefits and Gambling: Evidence from the NCAA Basketball
Betting Market, 39 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 376 (2013); Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and
Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86
B.U. L. REV. 371, 390 (2006); Steven Salaga & Scott Tainsky, Betting Lines and College Football
Television Ratings, 132 ECON. LETTERS 112 (2015).
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based on chance or skill, or on a combination thereof. Moreover, the
prohibition is intended to be broad enough to include all schemes
involving an actual game or games, or an actual performance or
performances therein.”49 In contrast, Congress intended § 3704’s
exemptions for certain states to be tightly construed: “The narrowness
of [§ 3704(a)] reflects the committee’s policy judgment that sports
gambling should be strictly contained.”50 However, Congress did not
specify the number or names of all the states exempted under PASPA:
“It appears that Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and possibly a few other
states would be exempt from the ban.”51
Congress also addressed the motivation for PASPA’s exemptions:
“Although the committee firmly believes that all such sports gambling
is harmful, it has no wish to apply this new prohibition
retroactively . . . or to prohibit lawful sports gambling schemes . . . that
were in operation when the legislation was introduced.”52 According to
Senator DeConcini, one of PASPA’s primary sponsors, “[t]he intent of
the legislation is not to interfere with existing laws, operations, or
revenue streams.”53 Senator Grassley disagreed: “There is simply no
rational basis, as a matter of Federal policy, for allowing sports
wagering in three States, while prohibiting it in the other 47, nor any
rational basis, or support in the language of [PASPA], for the
purported discrimination between Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware.”54

49. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 9 (1991). Relative measures of skill and chance have been how
states historically determined whether an activity was gambling. There is a continuum of
classifications used, with most states allowing contests where skill is the predominate factor, but
others banning games with any degree of chance. See Ryan Rodenberg, Why Do States Define
Gambling Differently?, ESPN.COM (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/147995
07/daily-fantasy-why-do-states-define-gambling-differently [https://perma.cc/A67A-A9ML]. For
example, the Plaintiff Sports Leagues have taken the position that
[s]ports gambling—particularly when it involves betting on the outcome of a single
athletic contest—is an activity in which skill plays a significant role, as bettors gather
and analyze information relating to the teams and sports on which they are betting and
compare their own internal assessments with those generated by odds-makers.
Verified Complaint at 16, Markell, 2009 WL 2450284 (D. Del. 2009) (No. 09-538).
50. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10.
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 8.
53. 138 CONG. REC. 12,973 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
54. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the status of PASPA
under the rational basis test, see infra Part IV.B.
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C. PASPA Exemptions and Legislative History
PASPA was the subject of two Congressional hearings: a June 26,
1991 hearing in the Senate55 and a September 14, 1991 hearing in the
House of Representatives.56 The 1992 Congressional Record indicates
that PASPA was discussed on the record no fewer than three times—
June 2, 1992 (Senate), October 5, 1992 (House), and October 7, 1992
(Senate). Both the 1991 hearings and 1992 floor debates strongly
suggest that members of Congress were unsure of both the identity and
the number of states subject to exemptions under PASPA’s
grandfathering scheme.57 For example, Senator DeConcini said: “I
agreed to provide an exemption from the legislation for those States
which already have laws permitting them to conduct State gambling;
namely, Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware. The Montana and South
Dakota sports boards would be grandfathered as well.”58

55. See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S.474 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
(1991).
56. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 19. The
two 1991 hearings were predated by a tangentially-related Senate bill that would have amended
the Lanham Act and addressed the use of professional sports’ service marks by state lotteries. See
Legislation Prohibiting State Lotteries from Misappropriating Prof’l Sports Service Marks:
Hearing on S. 1772 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990).
57. The legislative history suggests that certain states were not the only entities extended an
exemption under PASPA: “An Indian tribe may conduct, and may allow to be conducted, on
lands of a tribe in a State, only those particular sports gambling schemes that were in operation
on such lands prior to August 31, 1990.” S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10 (1991).
58. See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S.474 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 55,
at 2 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Curiously, Senator DeConcini did not mention South Dakota
less than a year later:
All of the States which are grandfathered by the bill have laws authorizing some type
of sports betting scheme. Nevada has its sports books, Oregon has a sports lottery on
football games, and Delaware conducted a sports lottery in the past and still has a law
on the books. It has recently come to my attention that Montana also has legalized
certain forms of sports betting. For years, Montana has permitted sports pools and
[C]alcutta pools. In 1991, they passed new legislation that allows for fantasy sports
leagues and sports tab games. These are limited-stakes sports wagering games played
in bingo parlors. Because of this new Montana law, the committee substitute before us
today changes the effective date of the grandfather to cover those gambling schemes
authorized prior to October 2, 1991. Let me make clear that the grandfather provision
only allows those States that have sports gambling authorized by State law to continue
to do what they are doing now or could do under State law. For example, Nevada could
not conduct a sports lottery and Oregon could not introduce other forms of sports
betting. What this bill will do is stop the spread of sports gambling and the threat that
gambling will spoil all the games involved.
138 CONG. REC. 12,973 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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The presence of PASPA’s grandfather clause and its tethered
exemptions gave rise to a robust debate on the Senate floor, as the
following verbatim excerpts from the Congressional Record reveal.
The lone lawmaker to voice broad opposition to PASPA was Senator
Grassley of Iowa, who proposed an amendment allowing any state to
unilaterally opt-in as exempt upon enactment of a permissive state law
before January 1, 1995.59 Senator Grassley stated:
If this were a bill about banning gambling, I would probably have a
different point of view. But that is not what this bill is about. This bill
purports to restrict gambling on sporting events by prohibiting certain
States from conducting sports lotteries, and it does so by
discriminating against many States, including my State of Iowa, and
preferring four States. In my judgment this is not a distriction [sic]
that Congress should tolerate. And my amendment is intended to
correct this deficiency.60

Senator Grassley then turned to a broader legal discussion of PASPA,
closing with a prophetic warning:
It is true that the courts require a showing of only a rational basis to
uphold a grandfather clause. But that rational basis must be
substantiated by a valid legislative purpose. It could be a legitimate
legislative purpose for Congress to ban gambling to protect the
welfare of the people. But that is not what this bill is about. This bill,
specifically, openly, and candidly, as stated by the sponsors, favors 4
States and penalizes the other 46. . . . [W]ithout my amendment this
bill discriminates between states that already have this sort of
gambling and the other 46 States that will be banned from it. Such
discrimination, in my judgment, is just plain wrong and, as I pointed
out from two court cases on grandfather clauses, arguably
unconstitutional. . . . If we really believe sports gambling is bad, as I
know we do, then we should have a nationwide consistent policy—it
should be prohibited in Oregon, Nevada, Montana, and Delaware as
well.61

Even one of the bill’s most vocal supporters opined that there was
a better alternative to PASPA’s grandfathering scheme. Immediately
following Senator Grassley’s lengthy statement, Senator Hatch said:

59. 138 CONG. REC. 12,974 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (seeking an amendment to
provide for certain exemptions to prohibited state activities).
60. Id. at 12,974–75 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Mr. President, this bill exempts four
States from its reach, and those are Delaware, Oregon, Montana, and Nevada.”).
61. Id. at 12,975 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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[W]e agreed to grandfathering because we had no choice. It would
have been better off to have banned all State sponsored sports
gambling. But the least we can do, it seems to me, is to stop the trend
of such gambling. . . . [PASPA] allows a few exceptions, four States,
in carefully circumscribed situations. . . . A vote for the Grassley
amendment is a vote to gut this bill. The National Football League,
the National Hockey League, the National Basketball Association,
[M]ajor [L]eague [B]aseball, and the NCAA all oppose the Grassley
amendment.62

PASPA sponsor Senator DeConcini voiced his opposition to the
Grassley amendment, too:
This amendment is completely inconsistent with the goal of the
legislation and would set a very bad precedent in the Congress. States
should not be given the choice about whether or not they want to be
covered by the law. . . . The Senator from Iowa is correct, there are
four exemptions and they are very carefully crafted to only include
those States and only include what the States have specifically, by
legislation, been authorized to do. It does not permit those states to
expand into other areas of sports gaming that they do not already
involve themselves in. . . . I would like to have it effective on all 50
States, but that is not in the cards.63

Senator Grassley articulated his position one final time prior to a
vote on his amendment:
[I]f what you propose is good for the country, then it also ought to be
good for Oregon, Delaware, Nevada, and Montana; they should not
have these exemptions. . . . I differ with the approach taken in this bill.
There is not a prohibition on sports gambling; it is a piece of Swiss
cheese. The bill contains loopholes that effectively exempt the States
of Oregon, Delaware, Nevada, and Montana. So if sports leagues
really want to end gambling on sporting events, they would seek a
complete ban nationwide.64

Senator Grassley’s proposed amendment to PASPA was rejected.
Four months later, the House debated PASPA’s exemptions.
Representative Hughes said: “Under this legislation, legalized betting
on amateur and professional sports would be prohibited in all states

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 12,976 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Id. at 12,976–77 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Id. at 12,977 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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except Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana.”65 Representative
Fish’s take on the scope of PASPA differed wildly:
This legislation would prospectively prevent States from authorizing
any new forms of sports gambling or expanding existing sports
lotteries. S. 474 would not apply to the Oregon sports lottery, which
[was] instituted prior to introduction of the legislation, to private
sports gambling in Nevada, nor to parimutuel racing. In addition, this
legislation would not preempt the State of Montana from conducting
sports pools, which are capped at $1,000; the State of North Dakota
which allows sports pools based on the outcome of professional
sporting events if conducted by qualified organizations; and the state
of Arizona which allows social gambling to include wagering on the
outcome of sporting events up to $100.66

Two days later, the Senate opened its debate regarding PASPA.
Senator Bradley provided another outlook on the number of states
exempted: “[T]his bill bans sports betting outright in 44 States and
given [sic] one state, New Jersey, only 1 year to act before it too would
be prohibited from allowing sports betting.”67 A subsequent exchange
on the Senate floor between New Mexico Senator Domenici and
Arizona Senator DeConcini is particularly illustrative of the apparent
role the Plaintiff Sports Leagues played in at least one carve-out under
PASPA. In relevant part:
65. Id. at 32,438 (statement of Rep. Hughes). Representative Hughes was from New Jersey.
The Congressional Record indicates that he played a role in § 3704(a)(3)’s one year carve-out for
New Jersey. Before Representative Hughes spoke, he was introduced by Representative Brooks
as follows: “I also want to note the contribution of the distinguished gentleman from New
Jersey . . . who has worked hard to safeguard the interests of his home State within the framework
of this legislation . . . .” Id. (statement of Rep. Brooks). Upon being introduced, Representative
Hughes provided insightful comments on the genesis of § 3704(a)(3)’s New Jersey-focused timelimited exemption:
The legislation also includes an amendment which I wrote which would exempt New
Jersey from this ban until January 1, 1994. New Jersey and Nevada are in direct
competition when it come [sic] to the gaming industry. It just would not be fair for
Congress to give Nevada a virtual monopoly on sports betting, without first giving New
Jersey residents the opportunity to vote on this proposal and decide for themselves.
Id. (statement of Rep. Hughes). In later comments, Rep. Hughes forecast the future litigation
involving the State: “This is not a vote in favor or [sic] legalizing sports betting in New Jersey.
Only the voters or [sic] New Jersey can do that. This bill would simply give them the chance to
decide this issue on their own, and not have the Federal Government decide it for them.” Id.
(statement of Rep. Hughes).
66. Id. at 32,439 (statement of Rep. Fish).
67. Id. at 33,823 (statement of Sen. Bradley). Senator Bradley did not identify the “44 states”
by name. In an academic article published around the same time PASPA was enacted, Senator
Bradley wrote: “That the prohibitions contained in the bills would vary among the states does not
in and of itself render them unconstitutional.” See Bradley, supra note 43, at 6.
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Senator Domenici: Shortly after the Senate-passage of [PASPA], I
was made aware of a situation that could be interpreted to fall under
the provisions of this bill. The New Mexico Legislature passed a law
that would allow our State to be the first in the Nation to venture into
what is a $13 billion industry in Japan—parimutuel bicycle racing, or
as it’s known in Japan, Keirin. . . . I discussed this situation with my
good friend from Arizona, Senator DeConcini. Upon reviewing a
description of Keirin, the Senator from Arizona also noted the
similarities between this sport and those exempted in the bill. I then
suggested the possibility of including Keirin in this language. My good
friend saw no initial reasons why that would be a problem.68
Senator DeConcini: That is correct.69
Senator Domenici: So, it is my understanding that my good friend
from Arizona cleared the possibility of exempting Keirin from the
provisions of this bill with our Nation’s major sports organizations,
the national [sic] Football League, the National Basketball
Association, Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League,
and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, to ensure that they
had no concerns.70
Senator DeConcini: It is my understanding that the leagues and the
NCAA do not object to this type of parimutuel bike racing and did
not intend for the bill to cover such a sport.71

68. 138 CONG. REC. 33,823 (1992) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
69. Id. (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
70. Id. The role of the Plaintiff Sports Leagues in gambling-related lawmaking and
regulatory action before and after PASPA’s enactment potentially raises constitutional issues
under the private non-delegation doctrine. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 133 S. Ct.
1225, 1234 (2015); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Brief of the Nat’l Football
League as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Negative Position at 11–15, In re Request of the
Governor for an Advisory Opinion, 12 A.3d 1104 (Del. 2009); Brief of Professor Ryan M.
Rodenberg as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Christie v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. 16-476 & 16-477 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2016); James M. Rice, The Private
Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and
International Organizations, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540 (2017). Relatedly, counsel for the
Plaintiff Sports Leagues alluded to a sports governing body’s capacity to bring suit under PASPA
during a standing-related portion of the Christie I oral argument:
And PASPA actually responds to that very specifically because it gives the NFL the
right to bring an action based on authorized gambling on NFL games. It gives the NBA
standing to bring the challenge based on gambling on NBA games. So it’s not like the
NFL can bring a claim about NBA, gambling on NBA games. It’s very specific to their
legal entitlement to protect their product.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 38. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One
Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2017).
71. 138 CONG. REC. 33,824 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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Senator Domenici: Would the Senator from Arizona agree that
[PASPA] was not designed to prohibit the State of New Mexico from
sanctioning Keirin?72
Senator DeConcini: Yes, I agree.73

New Mexico’s insertion into PASPA’s exempt list was
immediately followed—like a fight with the Hydra—by an exemption
inquiry from Senator Wallop of Wyoming. In relevant part:
Senator Wallop: Mr. President, I would like to ask my colleague from
Arizona, the sponsor of [PASPA] a question regarding his intent as
to the effect of the bill on certain actions in my home State of
Wyoming. . . . My concern centers in particular on the practice of
[C]alcutta wagering. . . . Calcutta wagering means wagering on the
outcome of amateur contests, cutter horse racing, professional rodeo
events, or professional golf tournaments . . . .74
Senator DeConcini: I appreciate the Senator’s point of view and I can
assure him that the practices which are now authorized and conducted
under Wyoming State law, including [C]alcutta wagering . . . will not
be affect[ed] by enactment of [PASPA].75

Taken together, evidence from Congress indicates that the
following states appear to be exempt in varying degrees under PASPA:
(i) Nevada; (ii) Delaware; (iii) Oregon; (iv) Montana; (v) North
Dakota; (vi) Arizona; (vii) South Dakota; (viii) New Mexico; and (ix)
Wyoming.76 This list differs markedly from the quartet of states
(Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana) repeatedly referenced
since 2012 by the judges and litigants in the New Jersey cases.77 As such,

72. Id. (statement of Sen. Domenici).
73. Id. (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
74. Id. (statement of Sen. Wallop).
75. Id. (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
76. Beyond the states that were specifically mentioned by Congress, certain sports pools in
Virginia, Colorado, and Iowa may be exempt too. See H. Wayne Clark Jr., Who’s In? The Bona
Fide Future of Office Pools, 8 GAMING L. REV. 202, 204 (2004). The Washington State Gambling
Commission (“WSGC”) has apparently taken the position that Washington is partially exempt
under PASPA as well. According to the WSGC, “[b]oth businesses and individuals may offer 100
square sports pool boards.” See WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, SPORTS WAGERING, (Aug.
2015), http://www.wsgc.wa.gov/publications/brochures/5-206-sports-wagering.pdf [https://perma.
cc/856P-BBCJ].
77. Oddly, the October 2016 Christie II en banc majority decision omitted Montana in its
synopsis: “Congress included in PASPA exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in
Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware . . . .” 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 2016) (en
banc).
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unlike other federal statutes with grandfather clauses listing exempt
states by name or with reference to specific geographic locations (e.g.
rivers or coastlines),78 it is plausible to infer that Congress opted against
such specificity in PASPA because Congress itself was unsure of the
grandfather clause’s scope. Such opaqueness and uncertainty have
implications for PASPA when evaluated under both the rational basis
test and the heightened level of scrutiny Shelby County seemingly
requires for statutes that treat states differently.
II. NEW JERSEY SPORTS BETTING LITIGATION
The New Jersey sports betting litigation has spawned two distinct
PASPA cases. In the first iteration of the case—known as Christie I—
the Plaintiff Sports Leagues sued Governor Christie on August 7, 2012
under PASPA after New Jersey enacted a new law that would permit
regulated sports betting in licensed casinos and racetracks.79 The
Plaintiff Sports Leagues obtained an injunction at the district court
level.80 New Jersey appealed to the Third Circuit with three arguments:
(i) the Plaintiff Sports Leagues lacked standing to bring the lawsuit; (ii)
PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment and its anti-commandeering
restrictions; and (iii) PASPA violated the equal sovereignty doctrine.81
In Christie I, a 2-1 Third Circuit majority reasoned that “while the
guarantee of uniformity in treatment amongst the states cabins some
of Congress’ powers, no such guarantee limits the Commerce
Clause.”82 In rejecting New Jersey’s equal sovereignty argument, the
court held: “[F]ar from singling out a handful of states for disfavored
treatment, PASPA treats more favorably a single state.”83 The Third

78. For examples, see Litman, supra note 17, at 1243–46.
79. See N.J.S.A 5:12A-1, et seq; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013) (No. 12-4947). The
DOJ later formally intervened in the case on the side of the Plaintiff Sports Leagues. See
Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act at 17, Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (No. 12-4947).
80. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
81. See generally Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie et al., supra note 20.
82. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 238 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (internal
citations omitted).
83. Id. at 239. The court also differentiated between the underlying subject matter of
Christie I and the statute at issue in Shelby County: “[T]he VRA is fundamentally different from
PASPA. . . . The regulation of gambling via the Commerce Clause is . . . not of the same nature
as the regulation of elections . . . .” Id. at 238.
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Circuit ruled against New Jersey on its standing84 and anticommandeering arguments too.85 New Jersey’s petition for a writ of
certiorari was denied on June 23, 2014.
The Christie I decision rested on a number of findings. The Third
Circuit wrote that “it is self-evident that the activity PASPA targets,
state-licensed wagering on sports, may be regulated consistent with the
Commerce Clause.”86 The court continued: “Here, the method of
regulation, banning an activity altogether (in this case the expansion of
State-sponsored sports betting), is neither novel nor problematic.”87 In
evaluating PASPA’s grandfather clause, the court ruled: “PASPA’s
legislative history is clear as to the purpose behind its own
exemptions.”88
The Third Circuit also addressed New Jersey’s “contention that
PASPA violates the equal sovereignty of the states by singling out
Nevada for preferential treatment.”89 New Jersey had asked that the
court “strike down all of PASPA because it permits Nevada to license
sports gambling.”90 The court flagged the weakness of this argument:
“[I]t is noteworthy that [New Jersey] do[es] not ask us to invalidate
§ 3704(a)(2), the Nevada grandfathering provision that supposedly
creates the equal sovereignty problem. Instead, we are asked to strike
down § 3702, PASPA’s general prohibition on state-licensed sports
gambling. . . . [This] undermines [New Jersey’s] invocation of the equal
sovereignty doctrine.”91
The Plaintiff Sports Leagues sued New Jersey again on October
20, 2014 after the state passed a new law designed to selectively repeal
sports betting prohibitions applicable to casinos and racetracks.92 In
Christie II, the Third Circuit sitting en banc concluded that New
Jersey’s attempt to partially repeal its own sports betting prohibition

84. See id. at 223–24 (holding that New Jersey’s arguments “do not legally deprive the
Leagues of standing and are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact”).
85. Id. at 237 (“We hold that PAPSA does not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.”).
86. Id. at 224.
87. Id. at 226.
88. Id. at 240 n.18. For a detailed discussion of the status of PASPA’s exemptions under Del.
River Basin Com’n v. Bucks Cty. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981), see infra Part
IV.D.
89. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 237.
90. Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 239.
92. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 14-6450).
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“violates PASPA because it authorizes by law sports gambling.”93
After a 9-3 Third Circuit en banc loss featuring two separate dissents,
New Jersey filed a certiorari petition on October 7, 2016.94 At the
Supreme Court’s invitation, the Acting Solicitor General filed an
amicus brief on May 23, 2017, recommending that the Supreme Court
deny New Jersey’s petition for a writ of certiorari.95 Christie II did not
address the equal sovereignty issue directly, but does implicate Shelby
County if PASPA is construed to prevent some states, but not others,
from partially repealing their own sports gambling laws and
regulations.96

93. Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 2016). Counsel for New Jersey described PASPA
in colorful terms during Christie II oral arguments, illustrative of the state’s frustration with the
statute: “This is an Orwellian concept . . . a statute that was enacted to prohibit the spread, or
limit the spread, of sports betting is somehow constitutional only if you allow it to take place
everywhere in the state.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, supra note 22 (three judge panel).
Indeed, for states not exempted by PASPA’s safe harbor, the law results in a paradox—Christie I
and Christie II suggest that states can either retain their sports gambling prohibition entirely or
completely repeal such laws, with partial repeals in between each extreme perhaps running afoul
of PASPA too. For example, counsel for the Plaintiff Sports Leagues opined that allowing up to
$1,000 bets between individuals would be a type of partial repeal in compliance with PASPA.
Oral Argument at 35:15, Christie II, 832 F.3d 389 (Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568 & 14-4569) (en banc),
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/14-4546NCAAv.GovernoroftheStateofNJetal
.mp3 [https://perma.cc/6R69-Y4DR].
94. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5.
95. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Association, 137 S. Ct. 824, 824 (2017); see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Nos. 16-476 & 16-477 (U.S. May 23, 2017). The
DOJ did not intervene as a party in Christie II. However, the DOJ did file a statement of interest
at the district court level and an amicus brief when the case was on appeal at the Third Circuit.
See Statement of Interest of the United States at 9, Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 (No. 14-6450)
(“PASPA reflects a considered congressional judgment that state sponsored sports wagering
should not occur.”); Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees at 9–10, Christie II, 832 F.3d 389 (Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568 & 14-4569) (“[B]ecause
PASPA preempts state sports gambling legislation that ‘authorizes by law,’ New Jersey cannot
repeal its restrictions on sports betting in a manner consistent with the state Constitution without
running afoul of PASPA.”). Christie II pits two former Solicitor Generals against each other. New
Jersey is represented by Ted Olson and the Plaintiff Sports Leagues are represented by Paul
Clement.
96. For example, after PASPA was enacted, Nevada augmented its regulations to allow
licensed sportsbooks to offer bets on in-state college teams such as the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. Such betting was previously barred. No PASPA lawsuit was filed following Nevada’s move
to repeal its betting ban on in-state colleges, giving rise to the possibility of a laches defense under
PASPA. See Ken Ritter, Gaming Control Board Allows Betting on Nevada College Sports, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Jan. 25, 2001), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2001/jan/25/gaming-control-boardallows-betting-on-nevada-coll/ [https://perma.cc/D474-68K5] (discussing the State Gaming
Commission’s decision to lift the ban on gambling on college sports teams in Nevada); Darren
Rovell, UNLV: Betting Ban Removal Won’t Change Much, ESPN.COM (Feb. 12, 2001),
http://www.espn.com/gen/s/2001/0210/1077033.html [https://perma.cc/NH78-M9T5] (discussing
Gaming Regulation 22.120(b), which lifted a ban on sports betting in Nevada); Matt Youmans,
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III. EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND PASPA
The Supreme Court decided Shelby County on June 25, 2013, one
day before Third Circuit oral arguments in Christie I. All three litigants
immediately filed same-day letters and positioned the decision with
their existing equal sovereignty arguments. New Jersey’s letter stated:
“The Court’s reasoning and decision compel the conclusion that
PASPA’s discrimination in favor of Nevada is likewise
unconstitutional.”97 New Jersey also posited that “Shelby County
definitively rejected the suggestion that discriminatory limitations on
State Sovereignty are appropriately assessed under the rational basis
test.”98 The Plaintiff Sports Leagues countered by pointing out what
Shelby County did not say: “[N]ot one word in Shelby County casts any
doubt . . . that Congress . . . may draw commerce-related distinctions
[between states] as long as it acts rationally.”99 The Plaintiff Sports
Leagues also flagged an important gap: “[E]ven if New Jersey’s
argument had merit—and it does not—Shelby County underscores that
the only appropriate result would be to invalidate PASPA’s
preferences, not PASPA’s general prohibition that New Jersey
challenges.”100 The DOJ letter argued: “Permitting state-sponsored

Bookmakers Don’t Expect Restrictions if Raiders Move to Las Vegas, LAS VEGAS REVIEWJOURNAL (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/bookmakers-dontexpect-restrictions-if-raiders-move-to-las-vegas/ [https://perma.cc/5LZK-9VV8] (same).
97. Letter from Theodore B. Olson, Counsel for Defendants-Appellants, to Marcia M.
Waldron, Clerk of the Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1 (June 25, 2013) (on
file with authors). New Jersey also refuted the DOJ’s earlier assertion that the equal sovereignty
doctrine is inapplicable to PASPA. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 193 (2009)).
New Jersey elaborated: “[T]he asserted reliance interest of Nevada in continuing to permit sports
wagering is not ‘sufficiently related’ to the State licensing and regulation of sports wagering that
Appellees say PASPA targets.” Id.
99. Letter from Paul D. Clement, Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees, to Marcia M. Waldron,
Clerk of the Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1 (June 25, 2013) (on file with
authors). The Plaintiff Sports Leagues also argued that “federal laws trumping state regulations
of commerce that conflict with federal policy are commonplace.” Id.
100. Id. at 2. Counsel for the Plaintiff Sports Leagues elaborated on this point the following
day during oral argument:
[I]f there is a problem with equal sovereignty, and we very much think it’s not, then
that equal sovereignty problem is with the exceptions in 3704 and not the basic
prohibition in 3702 which is New Jersey’s problem. And despite what Mr. Olson said,
striking 3704 and not 3702 would be exactly analogous to what the Supreme Court did
yesterday in [Shelby County]. It struck the provision, section four of the Voting Rights
Act that distinguished among the states. If you look at [PASPA] the provision that
distinguishes among states is 3704. It left in place, the Supreme Court that is, section
five of the Voting Rights Act, all of the other things that by their terms apply neutrally
to all states. That’s 3702.
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sports gambling to continue in States where it was already authorized,
while prohibiting it in States where it had not yet commenced, made
sense when Congress enacted PASPA, and it continues to ‘make sense
in light of current conditions.’”101 Beyond the trilogy of letters, the
parties made a number of equal sovereignty arguments in briefs filed
earlier. We summarize them below.
A. Equal Sovereignty Doctrine Primer
A synopsis of the Supreme Court’s equal sovereignty
jurisprudence illustrates its relevance to PASPA. According to Shelby
County: “Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of
current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”102 Shelby County
came four years after the Supreme Court addressed the equal
sovereignty doctrine in Northwest Austin103 and suggested a heightened
level of scrutiny in equal sovereignty cases: “[A] departure from the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a
statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.”104 Shelby County and Northwest Austin made
several other findings, all potentially relevant to PASPA: (i) “We
concluded that the problems Congress faced when it passed the [VRA]
were so dire that ‘exceptional conditions [could] justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate;’”105 (ii) “[T]his extraordinary
legislation was intended to be temporary, set to expire after five
years;”106 and (iii) “Our decision [to invalidate one portion of the
VRA] in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial
discrimination in voting found in [VRA] § 2.”107 The Court’s analysis
in Shelby County, coupled with Justice Ginsburg’s specific invocation
of PASPA in her dissent and Colby’s forceful argument, suggests that
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 51–52. Notably, both Justice Stevens in Greater
New Orleans and Justice Ginsburg in Shelby County explicitly referenced PASPA’s § 3704’s
exemptions—not § 3702’s blanket ban—as potentially troublesome.
101. Letter from Paul J. Fishman, Counsel for U.S., to Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk of the
Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1–2 (June 25, 2013) (on file with authors)
(citing Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013)). The DOJ described PASPA as “a
conventional exercise of Congress’s authority over interstate commerce.” Id. at 2.
102. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
103. Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
104. Id. at 203.
105. Id. at 199–200 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966)).
106. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625.
107. Id. at 2631.
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equal sovereignty scrutiny would apply to any statute with explicit
state-specific distinctions—not just voting rights legislation passed
under Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment powers. Further, the language
indicates that such scrutiny would carry with it a heightened level of
review beyond the rational basis test typically applied in statutes
passed under the Commerce Clause. Such a review deems that a
“departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”108
B. Professor Colby’s PASPA-Relevant Findings
According to Professor Colby, “[t]he equal sovereignty principle
thus does not categorically preclude Congress from ‘treat[ing] States
disparately’109 in any manner whatsoever; it does not foreclose ‘all laws
[that] affect different states differently.’”110 Rather, “[i]t is a guarantee
of equal sovereignty, not of equal treatment in all respects.”111 Upon
understanding “the limited nature of the equal sovereignty
principle,”112 Professor Colby found that most federal statutes
“identified by Justice Ginsburg as imperiled by the equal sovereignty
principle are not, in fact, threatened at all. But one of the laws that she
invokes does indeed fit the bill: [PASPA,] which prohibits sports
gambling, but exempts Nevada from its scope.”113 Professor Colby also
determined that PASPA “does not merely regulate private conduct; it
curtails the regulatory and revenue-raising authority of the states. It
precludes non-exempted states from legalizing sports gambling . . . .
Nevada may derive enormous financial benefits from casino sports
book betting, but other states may not.”114
Oral argument in Christie I took place one day after the Supreme
Court ruled in Shelby County. Professor Colby found that both the

108. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
109. Colby, supra note 2, at 1149 (citing Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
110. Id. (citing Eric Posner, John Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame,
SLATE (June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_
table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice
_john_roberts_struck.html [https://perma.cc/VE2G-7M9B]).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1154.
113. Id. at 1154–55.
114. Id. at 1155 (alteration in original) (citing Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten
Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (2005)).
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parties’ attorneys and Third Circuit judges “seemed uncertain of just
what to make of” Shelby County in the context of sports gambling.115
With the equal sovereignty principle “so surprisingly undeveloped,”
Professor Colby concluded that the Third Circuit “judges felt obligated
to confine it to the narrow context of the Voting Rights Act.”116
C. Litigants’ Equal Sovereignty Arguments
1. New Jersey. Lawyers for New Jersey focused their equal
sovereignty arguments on how their state was treated differently than
Nevada under PASPA.117 New Jersey argued: “The [DOJ] does not
contend that PASPA’s coverage is in any way ‘related to the problem
it targets.’ Nor could it, for PASPA exempted from its sweep the States
in which sports betting was most prevalent.”118 New Jersey also
addressed the current status of the sports gambling ‘problem’
nationwide: “Here, the supposed ‘problem’ of State-sanctioned sports
wagering is not rationally addressed by a statute that categorically
excludes the states (e.g., Nevada) that manifest that ‘problem.’”119
New Jersey also devoted time to dissecting PASPA’s grandfather
clause: “In the Third Circuit, permanent exemptions for existing uses
are disfavored. The degree of reliance does not alter the Third Circuit’s
suspicion of permanent grandfathering.”120 Similarly, the State pointed
towards the absence of case law on the topic: “The [Plaintiff Sports]
Leagues rest their defense on Nevada’s ‘reliance’ interest, but fail to
identify any case invoking reliance to authorize permanent
discriminatory limitations on the sovereign legislative authorities of the
115. Id. at 1090.
116. Id. at 1091.
117. New Jersey also provided background regarding PASPA’s enactment: “The interest of
Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana in obtaining a monopoly on sports wagering aligned
with the interest of legislators who opposed sports wagering altogether.” Brief for Appellants
Christopher J. Christie et al., supra note 20, at 11. New Jersey continued: “The [DOJ] previously
admitted that PASPA resulted from just such legislative horse-trading; the [DOJ] states that ‘the
decision to allow certain states to maintain their status quo reflects the reality of the bargaining
process inherent in the passage of legislation.’” Id. at 11 n.6 (quoting Federal Defendants’ Motion
To Dismiss at 25, iMEGA, No. 09-1301, 2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011)).
118. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
119. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), cert. denied. New Jersey also addressed the Plaintiff Sports Leagues’
embrace of daily fantasy sports: “For their part, the [Plaintiff Sports] Leagues clearly no longer
view sports wagering as an evil; they actively sponsor wagering through ‘fantasy’ bets.” Brief for
Appellants Christopher J. Christie et al., supra note 20, at 11 n.7.
120. Del. River Basin Comm’n v. Bucks Cty. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087, 1098 (3d
Cir. 1981).
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States.”121 New Jersey also highlighted PASPA’s different effect on
grandfathered and non-grandfathered states: “PASPA plainly gives
the disfavored States less sovereign power with respect to sports
wagering than it gives to the favored States, because only the favored
States have the power to decide whether to permit such wagering.”122
In its Christie I petition for a writ of certiorari, New Jersey also
addressed the severability issue and rebutted the Third Circuit’s
observation that PASPA’s exemptions in § 3704—not its general ban
in § 3702—would be the focus of any finding that PASPA violated the
equal sovereignty doctrine:
The Third Circuit’s suggestion that a proper remedy would be to
invalidate Nevada’s preference, meanwhile, is not a justification for
the Third Circuit having found no violation of equal sovereignty at all.
And, of course, if it had found Nevada’s preference unconstitutional,
it may also have concluded that the preference was not severable from
the rest of PASPA.123

2. Plaintiff Sports Leagues. The Plaintiff Sports Leagues
positioned New Jersey’s equal sovereignty challenge as “splitless and
novel,” contending that it “would expand the equal sovereignty
principle articulated in Shelby County beyond all recognition.”124 The
league quintet reiterated that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly
reaffirmed that there is no ‘requirement of uniformity in connection
with the commerce power.’”125 The Plaintiff Sports Leagues also noted
the lack of “any cases addressing the broader question of whether
Shelby County has any bearing on Commerce Clause legislation.”126
Most importantly, the Plaintiff Sports Leagues argued that New

121. Reply Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie et al. at 28, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208
(3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714 & 13-1715) (emphasis omitted).
122. Id. at 56.
123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 119, at 33 n.8.
124. Brief in Opposition at 28, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866
(2014) (Nos. 13-967, 13-979 & 13-980), cert. denied.
125. Id. at 35 (quoting Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939)). The Plaintiff Sports Leagues
provided background:
Here, the Court need look no further than the legislative history of PASPA to conclude
that Congress had eminently rational reasons for exempting states with pre-existing
gambling schemes from PASPA’s prohibitions. The ample legislative record plainly
reveals Congress’ intent to offer a limited accommodation of the economic reliance
interest of a handful of states.
Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 57–58, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714 &
13-1715).
126. Brief in Opposition, supra note 124, at 29.
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Jersey’s equal sovereignty argument—even if it was accepted—was
adverse to its goal:
[New Jersey’s] argument is largely academic, as it would not entitle
them to the remedy they seek. As the [Third Circuit] correctly
noted . . . even assuming PASPA’s grandfathering clause were
constitutionally infirm, at most, that would support invalidation of
[§ 3704], not invalidation of PASPA in its entirety. If there were a
problem with the favorable treatment of four states, the logical
remedy would be to treat them like the other 46, not vitiate PASPA
in toto. Thus, even if [New Jersey] prevailed on [its] equal sovereignty
argument, PASPA would still prohibit operation of New Jersey’s
sports gambling scheme.127

3. Department of Justice. The DOJ’s take on equal sovereignty
differed somewhat from the Plaintiff Sports Leagues’ position. The
DOJ concluded that “[e]qual sovereignty principles do not apply to
legislation under the Commerce Clause,”128 explaining that equal
sovereignty principles “appl[y] only to the terms upon which States are
admitted to the Union.”129 The government argued that a Commerce
Clause-enacted grandfather clause is permissible “as long as it satisfies
the two-part rationality standard.”130 The DOJ explained PASPA’s
grandfather clauses as follows:
[T]he first grandfather clause, § 3704(a)(1), permitted Oregon and
Delaware to ‘conduct sports lotteries on any sport,’ because sports
lotteries were previously conducted by those states . . . the second
grandfather clause, § 3704(a)(2), permitted casino gambling on
sporting events to continue (but not expand) in Nevada to the extent
that it was previously conducted.131

127. Id. at 30–31.
128. Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, supra note 79, at 17.
129. Id. at 51 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)) (emphasis
omitted).
130. Brief for Appellee United States of America at 49, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (Nos. 131713, 13-1714 & 13-1715). The DOJ elaborated: “The doctrine of equal sovereignty is not an
impediment to the constitutionality of PASPA, which, even with its grandfather clauses, is
permissible Commerce Clause legislation.” Id. at 56.
131. Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, supra note 79, at 4 n.1. Curiously, the DOJ mentioned the Supreme Court’s
reference to PASPA in Greater New Orleans, but did not include the Court’s finding that PASPA
“includes a variety of exemptions, some with obscured congressional purposes.” Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999); see Memorandum in Support of
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Montana’s exemption received special mention too: “Montana law had
long allowed sports pools and [C]alcutta pools and had more recently
permitted fantasy sports leagues and sports tab games.”132
The DOJ looked to Supreme Court precedent in defending
PASPA’s grandfather clause generally: “PASPA’s specific exceptions
do not undermine its rationality. . . . [I]t is permissible for the
legislature to proceed by ‘adopting regulations that only partially
ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the
evil to future regulations.’”133 The DOJ continued: “[I]t was reasonable
for Congress to create exceptions for pre-existing sports gambling
operations, as a means of accounting for the reliance interests that
certain States had in the legality of those operations.”134
IV. ANALYZING PASPA UNDER THE EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY
DOCTRINE
PASPA’s exemptions for Nevada and at least eight other states
are unconstitutional under Shelby County’s equal sovereignty
standard. PASPA’s general ban on sports gambling in § 3702, in
contrast, does not trigger an equal sovereignty doctrine violation. This
conclusion does not render PASPA unconstitutional in its entirety,
only the severable grandfather clauses in § 3704(a)(1) and § 3704(a)(2).
Indeed, our conclusion highlights New Jersey’s misplaced emphasis on
the equal sovereignty doctrine during the ongoing litigation. We reach
our conclusion by analyzing PASPA under the rational basis test and
Shelby County’s heightened “sufficiently related” standard of review.
Like the Third Circuit in Christie I, we also evaluate PASPA’s
grandfather clause outside the parameters of Shelby County. All modes
of analysis push us towards finding PASPA’s § 3704(a)(1) and §
3704(a)(2) exemptions to run afoul of the equal sovereignty doctrine.
A. New Jersey’s Misplaced Argument
For understandable reasons—the state was trying to negate
PASPA’s broad prohibition directed at it—New Jersey put all of its
equal sovereignty argument eggs in the § 3702 basket. But New Jersey’s
the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, supra note 79, at 6
n.2.
132. Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, supra note 79, at 4 n.1.
133. Id. at 23 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 306 (1976)).
134. Id. at 23–24.
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§ 3702 equal sovereignty argument was misplaced. PASPA’s potential
unconstitutionality under the equal sovereignty doctrine falls to §
3704’s discriminatory exemption of certain states, not § 3702’s
prohibition.135 Indeed, § 3704’s grandfathering provision for Nevada
and other states creates the equal sovereignty problem, not the blanket
ban in § 3702. This result is bad news for New Jersey and Nevada, but
good news for a proper interpretation of PASPA under the equal
sovereignty doctrine.
The remedy New Jersey sought—a complete invalidation of
PASPA’s § 3702 ban—was more than the equal sovereignty doctrine
allowed. Like Shelby County’s narrowly tailored ruling pertaining
solely to its coverage formula in VRA § 4(b), but not its broader
provisions, a similar surgical result is appropriate in the case of
PASPA. Supreme Court precedent establishes that severability is
appropriate when only a portion of a statute is unconstitutional. United
States v. Booker136 concluded that courts should “refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.”137 Likewise, Regan
v. Time, Inc.138 found a “presumption . . . in favor of severability.”139
Finally, the Supreme Court opined:
The standard for determining the severability of an unconstitutional
provision is well established: Unless it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if
what is left is fully operational law.140

This is the cruel irony of New Jersey’s use of the equal sovereignty
argument. PASPA has severe constitutional infirmities when put under
equal sovereignty scrutiny. But attacking PASPA on equal sovereignty
grounds is self-defeating for a state like New Jersey that wants to be
involved in sports gambling. Weaponizing the equal sovereignty
doctrine against PASPA is best suited for a state—like Utah,
perhaps—that does not want sports gambling.

135. Section 3704 references the time-limited exemptions for certain sports betting schemes;
whereas § 3702 provides for an across-the-board ban on sports wagering schemes.
136. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
137. Id. at 258.
138. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
139. Id. at 652.
140. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
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B. PASPA and Rational Basis Review
Congress is required to provide a “clear statement” explaining
federal statutes, such as PASPA, that involve matters typically left for
the states.141 Indeed, Congress explicitly stated that “the States should
have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of
gambling may legally take place within their borders.142 Federal courts
have recognized the same: “Throughout our history, the regulation of
gambling has been largely left to the state legislatures.”143 According to
the DOJ in 1991, “it is left to the states to decide whether to permit
gambling activities based upon sporting events [and] we note that
determinations of how to raise revenue have typically been left to the
states.”144 By positioning sports gambling as a “national problem” with
harms that “cannot be limited geographically,”145 PASPA’s text and
legislative history clearly indicate that Congress was motivated to
invoke the Supremacy Clause and ban sports gambling.146 What is

141. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (noting that Congress must provide an
“unmistakably clear” explanation whenever it “alter[s] the usual constitutional balance between
the States and the Federal Government”).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1) (2012); see also Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why
Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1576 (1999) (“Gambling
legislation is largely a matter of state law and, as a result, varies considerably.”).
143. United States v. King, 834 F.2d 109, 111 (6th Cir. 1987).
144. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, supra note 18, at 1–2.
145. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
146. The preemption doctrine can be traced to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819),
with modern iterations emerging during the New Deal era. Congress has broad powers to act
within its enumerated powers (e.g. the Commerce Clause) to preempt state regulations that
interfere with federal objectives, subject to the Necessary and Proper Clause. See EDWIN MEESE,
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 382–84 (2d ed. 2014). In Christie I, the District
Court judge wrote: “[I]f PASPA is held to be constitutional, then the [New Jersey] Sports
Wagering Law must be stricken as preempted by the Supremacy Clause.” Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (D.N.J. 2013). The District Court found
PASPA to be a constitutional exercise of federal power. Id. During oral arguments at the Third
Circuit, New Jersey posited that the DOJ had disavowed a suggestion that PASPA preempts state
laws. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 12. In contrast, the Plaintiff Sports
Leagues argued:
But if I read PASPA, one way to characterize it is it’s an express preemption provision.
It says that a state can’t pass a particular kind of law. Why is that? Because the federal
government in PASPA itself has announced a federal policy that it doesn’t want statesponsored [sports] gambling.
See id. at 42. The Plaintiff Sports Leagues’ assertion that PASPA is an example of express
preemption was at odds with the DOJ’s stance: “Is it preemption? Technically I don’t know the
answer to that question.” See id. at 56. The Third Circuit Christie I majority described § 3702’s
blanket ban on sports gambling as “classic preemption language that operates[] via the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.” 730 F.3d at 226. In arguing that PASPA impermissibly
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unclear, however, is how harms that “are felt beyond the borders of
States that sanction [sports gambling]” are addressed by exceptions to
the general ban for states where sports gambling already legally takes
place.147
PASPA’s shortcomings under Gregory v. Ashcroft’s clear
statement rule are illustrative of broader problems when scrutinized
under the rational basis test used in Commerce Clause actions. The
Supreme Court set forth a two-part test in Hodel v. Indiana: “A court
may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if
it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that
the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the
asserted ends.”148 PASPA almost certainly meets the first prong.149
However, PASPA fails the second part of this test for two reasons.
First, PASPA does not include any federal regulatory apparatus.
PASPA is solely a directive towards the non-exempt states, with an

regulates how states regulate sports gambling, Judge Vanaskie in dissent argued that unlike other
preemption cases
in which federal legislation limits the actions of state governments, in this case, there is
no federal scheme regulating or deregulating sports gambling by which to preempt
state regulation. PASPA provides no federal regulatory standards or requirements of
its own. Instead, it simply prohibits states from ‘sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing],
promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing]’ gambling on sports.
Id. at 247 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 3792(1) (2012)).
Judge Vanaskie noted that Congress has the power to preempt state sports gambling regulations;
however, that is not what PASPA does because it provides no regulatory (or deregulatory)
scheme. Id. (Vanaksie, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent cited various federal sports gambling
statutes such as the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012), and the Sports Bribery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 224
(2012), that are deferential to the states and predicate a violation on individual state laws. Christie
I, 730 F.3d at 247 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
147. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5.
148. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981).
149. In 1903, the Supreme Court held that Congress has the power to ban gambling under
the Commerce Clause. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 326–30 (1903). Counsel for New Jersey
conceded this point during the Christie II three judge panel oral argument. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 22, at 62 (acknowledging, in response to a question from the panel, that
Congress could “have simply banned all sports betting”). Further, the Supreme Court found
“[g]ambling . . . implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category of
‘vice’ activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether.” United States v. Edge
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). The Plaintiff Sports Leagues also posited that the statute at
issue in Christie I “gives rise to a presumption of invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause”
because of the law’s “protectionist exclusion of collegiate games held in-state or involving in-state
colleges from the reach of its unlawful gaming scheme.” Brief in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment and, if Necessary, to Preserve the Status Quo, a Preliminary Injunction
at 13 n.7, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013) (No. 124947).
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accommodating carve-out for favored exempt states. Second, if
Congress’s goal was to address a national problem and stop the spread
of gambling, it would not have allowed sports gambling to continue to
expand in Nevada and elsewhere via a permanent exemption. Rather,
Congress could have: (i) banned such gambling entirely; (ii) included a
temporary “phase-out” period for then-existing sports betting; or (iii)
definitively “frozen in time” the scope and type of sports betting that
is allowed in exempt states with enforcement mechanisms and
penalties that compel compliance.
As discussed above in Part I.B., PASPA was also motivated to
stop the spread of sports gambling nationwide. PASPA has failed on
this metric too. A contemporary example—the rise of so-called “daily
fantasy sports”—is illustrative in this regard. With the underlying
money staked “on one or more performances of . . . athletes
in . . . games,”150 daily fantasy sports are subject to PASPA’s coverage
scheme. To date, neither the DOJ nor the Plaintiff Sports Leagues (or
any other sports leagues for that matter), have filed a PASPA lawsuit
to limit state authorization of such fantasy betting platforms in Indiana,
Mississippi, Virginia, Tennessee, New York, Massachusetts, Missouri,
or Colorado—all states that recently enacted fantasy-friendly laws but
are not exempt under PASPA.151 As discussed supra,152 Senator
DeConcini and the DOJ specifically referenced Montana’s fantasy
sports legislation, indicating that both considered fantasy sports to fall
within PASPA’s purview. On a different issue, the Plaintiff Sports
Leagues explained Nevada’s special status as follows: “[Congress was]

150. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
151. See Chris Grove, States Passing Fantasy Sports Bills May Be Authorizing Far More
Sports Betting Than They Realize, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 19, 2016, 2:37 P.M.), http://www.
legalsportsreport.com/8421/dfs-bills-authorize-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/T96T-7Q2S]; see
also David Purdum, Future of Sports Betting: Fantasy Sports, ESPN.COM (May 4, 2017), http://
www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19309213/chalk-why-fantasy-sports-sports-betting-collisioncourse-us [https://perma.cc/J27D-463C] (“The line between traditional sports betting and fantasy
sports is blurring rapidly and soon may be erased altogether.”). Indeed, the expansion of fantasy
sports-friendly legislation in non-exempt states runs counter to the Solicitor General’s conclusion
that “[n]o other State has enacted legislation claimed to conflict with PASPA.” See Brief for the
United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 95, at 22. Betting
on video game competitions may implicate PASPA too. See Sara Friedman, Beyond Nevada, ESports May Challenge PASPA Rules, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://gambling
compliance.com/premium-content/news_analysis/beyond-nevada-e-sports-may-challenge-pasparules [https://perma.cc/VEJ2-Q3S3].
152. See 138 CONG. REC. 12,973 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see also
Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act, supra note 79, at 4 n.1.
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willing to allow, to grandfather in Nevada, not because they thought
that was great, but because I think they made the kind of measured
judgment that Congresses make, which is that there’s reliance interests
in Las Vegas.”153 PASPA’s exemptions were by no means a measured
judgment, as a review of the legislative history and Congressional
Record demonstrably show. Congress was unaware of the exact
number or identity of the states exempted.154 The Supreme Court
found PASPA’s exemptions to derive from “obscured congressional
purposes.”155 Even the Plaintiff Sports Leagues described PASPA’s
exemption-related legislative history as “undeniably muddled” and
“internally inconsistent.”156
PASPA’s legislative sausage-making was devoid of a rational basis
between the identified problem and legislative remedy. Addressing a
“national problem” with an undefined grandfathering clause makes
little sense. Indeed, the first sentence of the Third Circuit’s Christie I
decision is revealing—and unintentionally ironic—on this point:
“Betting on sports is an activity that has unarguably increased in
popularity over the last several decades.”157 While the DOJ posited that
“PASPA does not permit any of the States in which sports gambling
were already taking place to authorize or license new sports gambling
schemes in the future,”158 the practical reality is far different. Betting
volume in Nevada has nearly tripled since PASPA’s enactment, with a

153. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 36. New Jersey rebutted the ‘reliance’
explanation as follows: “If PASPA were really about reliance, it would limit the favored States to
the amount of sports wagering that existed in 1991, rather than permitting the exponential
increase that has occurred in those States since PASPA was enacted.” Brief for Appellants
Christopher J. Christie et al., supra note 20, at 15 n.7.
154. See supra Part I.C.
155. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999).
156. Brief in Opposition, supra note 25, at 17.
157. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013).
158. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 22 n.10, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2014) (Nos. 13-967, 13-979 & 13-980.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (“The line drawn by
PASPA’s grandfathering provisions is thus not a line between favored and disfavored States, but
rather a line between one class of sports gambling schemes (those already in existence) and
another (future ones).”).
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plethora of new schemes not available or authorized in 1992.159 Further,
daily fantasy sports now takes place in about 38 states nationwide.160
C. PASPA Under Heightened Scrutiny
According to Professor Colby, a “federal statute that contravenes
the equal sovereignty principle should simply trigger some form of
heightened scrutiny, requiring the federal government to justify the
disparate treatment.”161 Indeed, Northwest Austin declared that “a
departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”162 Professor Colby
said this would “require Congress to provide a strong justification for
treating the states as unequal sovereigns” and PASPA may be
deficient:
In the case of PASPA, it is highly questionable whether such a
justification can be found. Even Congress admitted that the problem
that the law addresses is national in scope. The only possible
justification for treating the states differently is a desire to
‘grandfather’ existing state laws that had relied to a substantial degree
on the lack of contrary federal regulation. Whether that is a sufficient
justification for permanently favoring some states over others in their
ability to regulate an important subject is, at the very least, a dubious
proposition.163

More broadly, Shelby County stands for the proposition that,
when a court evaluates a federal statute that facially discriminates
between the states, the court must undertake a careful review to
discern whether the state-level differentiation is “sufficiently related to

159. In 1992, the total amount legally bet on sports in Nevada was $1.8 billion. DAVID G.
SCHWARTZ, CTR. FOR GAMING RESEARCH, UNIV. OF NEV. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA SPORTS
BETTING TOTALS: 1984–2016, at 6 (2017), http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/NV_sportsbetting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AL5P-YFQA]. In 2016, the total amount legally bet on sports in Nevada was
$4.5 billion. Id. Nevada also offers a host of betting options that were neither authorized nor
offered upon PASPA’s enactment. Examples include real-time betting, entity betting, player draft
selection wagers, mobile betting, wagering on in-state colleges, and “eSports” betting. See
Anastasios Kaburakis, Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State
Regulation, and the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 31 n.19 (2015).
160. Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, Sports Betting, LEGAL
SPORTS REP., http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-bill-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/DW4M-F35J].
161. Colby, supra note 2, at 1156.
162. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).
163. Colby, supra note 2, at 1156–57 (internal citations omitted).

RODENBERG IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/22/2017 1:29 PM

SPORTS BETTING & EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY

33

the problem that it targets.”164 The Supreme Court did that in Shelby
County, painstakingly reviewing all the factors that went into
Congress’s determinations about the (continuing) need to treat states
differently. The Third Circuit never undertook such an analysis in
connection with PASPA’s exemptions.
For example, in Christie II, the court wrote: “we are not asked to
judge the wisdom of PASPA.”165 Shelby County requires otherwise
when state equal sovereignty is implicated. The Third Circuit in
Christie I made a critical error in concluding that PASPA’s legislative
history was “clear.”166 PASPA’s disparate treatment of some states is
not sufficiently related to the problem it targets, a problem exacerbated
by the statute’s “undeniably muddled” and “internally inconsistent”167
legislative history pertaining to PASPA’s carve-outs, which the
Supreme Court found derived from “obscured Congressional
purposes.”168
PASPA’s permanent geographic-based grandfathering subsections in § 3704(a)(1) and § 3704(a)(2) are subject to equal
sovereignty scrutiny.169 Unlike the enactment of the Voting Rights Act
in the 1960’s, there were no “exceptional circumstances” involving
sports betting in certain geographic locations 25 years ago when
PASPA was enacted. Sports betting was—and is—“as widespread as
air.”170 In 1992, sports betting was easily accessible via phone, in
Nevada sportsbooks, and at various bars, restaurants, and street
corners nationwide. In 2017, sports betting is available in all the same
places, as well as online via a computer or smartphone app. Sports
betting did not have any meaningful geographic nexus in 1992 and does
not have any in 2017.
In 1991, Congress relied on testimony from certain executives
working for the Plaintiff Sports Leagues, all of whom spoke of how

164. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
165. Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Christie I, 730 F.3d 208,
215 (3d Cir. 2013)).
166. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 240 n.18.
167. Brief in Opposition, supra note 25, at 17.
168. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999).
169. Neither § 3704(a)(3) nor § 3704(a)(4) would trigger the equal sovereignty doctrine, as
the former has expired due to the lapse of time and the latter does not differentiate between
states.
170. Michael Rosenberg, Newsflash: There’s Gambling in Sports; Time To Regulate, Not Ban
It, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.si.com/more-sports/2012/08/14/gambling
[https://perma.cc/SLS9-93FK ].
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their employers were injured by legalized sports betting.171 Some of the
current executives of the Plaintiff Sports Leagues plainly disagree with
their predecessors. For example, NBA executive Adam Silver penned
a New York Times op-ed that touched on many of the issues relevant
to PASPA under an equal sovereignty analysis. According to Silver: (i)
“[i]n light of . . . domestic and global trends, the laws on sports
gambling should be changed;” (ii) “I believe we need a different
approach;” and (iii) “[t]imes have changed since PASPA was
enacted.”172 In another example, NFL executive Roger Goodell
described Nevada’s sports betting regulatory apparatus as potentially
“beneficial” in the context of the Oakland Raiders upcoming
relocation to Las Vegas.173
Under Shelby County, federal statutes that differentiate between
the states must take “current conditions” into consideration. PASPA
falls short in this inquiry, as the law is “outdated.”174 As pre-Internet
legislation, PASPA wholly fails to take into account the online
presence of sports betting nationwide—illegally through offshore
websites and legally via smartphone apps with Nevada sportsbooks and
daily fantasy operators. More broadly, Nevada’s considerable
expansion of legal sports gambling since 1992, coupled with widespread
illegal internet-fueled sports betting domestically and via offshore
websites, have exacerbated PASPA’s equal sovereignty problems.
Congress may have desired for sports gambling to be “strictly
contained”175 in § 3704(a)’s exemptions to § 3702’s general ban, but this
has proven illusory.

171. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 19, at 92;
see also Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S.474 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 55, at 2.
172. Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalizesports-betting.html [https://perma.cc/59SX-WVMD].
173. David Purdum, Roger Goodell Says NFL Still Opposed to Legalized Sports Betting,
ESPN.COM (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19027576/nfl-commissionerroger-goodell-says-league-opposed-legalized-sports-betting-raiders-moving-las-vegas
[https://
perma.cc/4S7K-N54Q].
174. Darren A. Heitner, The Plight of PASPA: It’s Time to Pull the Plug on the Prohibition,
14 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 249, 249 (2010).
175. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10 (1991).

RODENBERG IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/22/2017 1:29 PM

SPORTS BETTING & EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY

35

D. Permanent Grandfathering Clauses and PASPA
Senator Grassley’s 1992 criticism of PASPA’s grandfather clause
on the Senate floor carried strong legal overtones, anticipating the
inevitable litigation to be spawned by PASPA. Senator Grassley cited
two cases to support his position—the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mayflower Farms v. Eyck176 and the Third Circuit’s ruling in Delaware
River Basin v. Bucks County.177 In Mayflower Farms, the Court found
a mandatory milk pricing law with a grandfathered cut-off date to be
“arbitrary and unreasonable” and “an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as
against all those who enter the industry after that date.”178 PASPA
functions much the same way, but is more extreme than Mayflower
Farms’ overturned milk pricing law in that PASPA mandates
compliance by non-favored states, not merely disfavored private
companies. In Delaware River Basin, the Third Circuit found:
“[F]avortism of this sort might often appear the product of a political
arrangement that does no more than favor one interest at the expense
of another rather than the result of a reasoned judgment about a
socially beneficial policy.”179
Indeed, the Third Circuit made a critical error when applying the
Delaware River Basin case to PASPA’s grandfather clause. The
Christie I court wrote: “PASPA’s legislative history is clear as to the
purpose behind its own exemptions, and thus survives Delaware River
Basin.”180 This conclusion is flatly contradicted by Supreme Court
precedent and the Plaintiff Sports Leagues’ own pleadings. Fourteen
years before Christie I, Greater New Orleans found PASPA’s
exemptions to derive from “obscured Congressional purposes.”181
Likewise, in Markell, the Plaintiff Sports Leagues described the
legislative history surrounding PASPA’s grandfather clause as
“undeniably muddled” and “internally inconsistent.”182 As such,
especially when viewed in light of Shelby County’s elevated level of
review, PASPA’s state-level discrimination is problematic.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Mayflower Farms v. Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936).
Del. River Basin v. Bucks Cty. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981).
297 U.S. at 274.
641 F.2d at 1095–96 (internal citations omitted).
Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 240 n.18.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999).
Brief in Opposition, supra note 25, at 17.
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PASPA’s carve-outs have broader problems. PASPA stands alone
in permanently allowing an activity deemed problematic to continue in
certain states, but not others.183 By doing so, PASPA turns the
commonly accepted justification for grandfathering clauses on its head.
Unlike the Clean Air Act184—a federal statute that treats California
differently than the other 49 states in the furtherance of more stringent
and environmentally-beneficial automobile emissions standards—
PASPA “encourages the continuation of a purportedly undesirable
activity in certain jurisdictions forever.”185 Containment-based
grandfather clauses like PASPA’s typically include some termination
date, as permanent exemptions with the effect of preserving and
furthering identified problems forever are disfavored and likely
barred.186
The DOJ revealingly previewed why PASPA’s exemptions give
rise to equal sovereignty problems when Christie I was still at the
district court level.187 In distinguishing PASPA from the problematic

183. Holden, Kaburakis & Rodenberg, supra note 21, at 3 (“Ameliorative legislation is that
which allows for the continuation of programs with perceived positive effects. Containment-based
legislation is that which seeks to stop the spread of purportedly undesirable activity.”).
184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
185. Holden, Kaburakis & Rodenberg, supra note 21, at 7–8 (“[T]here is no recognizable
legislative precedent for perpetually allowing purportedly undesirable behavior in certain
jurisdictions, but not others.”).
186. Id.
187. For example, the DOJ cited Haves v. Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1995), as follows:
“A state may legitimately use grandfather provisions to protect property owners’ reliance
interests.” Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, supra note 79, at 24. Appealing to Haves is particularly problematic in the
context of PASPA. Not only did Haves pertain to city houseboat ordinances, an activity wildly
different than state-level restrictions on sports betting, but the DOJ would tread into
unprecedented territory if it suggests that Nevada and other grandfathered states have a property
interest in offering different forms of sports wagering, an activity described as a vice by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). Further, in justifying
PASPA’s exceptions, neither the DOJ nor the Plaintiff Sports Leagues cite any case for the
proposition that an ownership interest vests in the ability of some states—but not others—to offer
sports betting. Relatedly, there is a similar lack of authority for the proposition that sports leagues
can be the arbiters of which states can offer betting propositions. While sports leagues have
property interests in the copyrighted broadcasts and various protected marks associated with
leagues and teams, vast swaths of data and information that comprise betting propositions have
historically been found to be within the public domain. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg, John
T. Holden & Asa Brown, Real-Time Sports Data and the First Amendment, 11 WASH. J. L. TECH.
& ARTS 63 (2015) (discussing the tension between sports leagues’ attempts to monetize
information and the broad availability of sports data in the public domain); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am. Broad. Cos. Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (“When a television network broadcasts a live sporting event,
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grandfather clause in Delaware River Basin, the DOJ wrote: “By
contrast, with PASPA, but for the reliance interests of certain States,
Congress might have eliminated the object of the grandfather clause
(sports gambling) . . . .”188 The DOJ thus suggests that “reliance
interests” are the only reason purportedly justifying PASPA’s carveouts for Nevada and other states. This moves into dangerous ground
for PASPA’s continuing constitutional viability under the equal
sovereignty doctrine. As PASPA’s name makes clear, PASPA was
justified as a means to protect sports leagues from a “national problem”
that has an impact beyond geographic borders.189 At no time did
Congress state that PASPA’s sole purpose was to protect sports
gambling reliance interests in Nevada and other states. Tellingly,
neither Congress nor the DOJ explained how a “national problem”
could simultaneously be a reliance interest as a legal activity in some
states, while completely banned in others. Further, the DOJ’s
reasoning here gives rise to the possibility that any such reliance
interest would trigger a Takings Clause issue or property claim if
revoked.190
Congress could have structured PASPA’s carve-outs as sunset
provisions that would expire or be reevaluated after a predetermined
number of years, like Congress did for the statute at issue in Shelby
County. Congress opted instead to make PASPA’s grandfather clause
perpetual, pushing the statute beyond the extent of the statute
invalidated by Shelby County. As such, the Third Circuit’s failure to
evaluate whether PASPA “makes sense in light of current
conditions”191 is even more glaring under Shelby County’s equal
sovereignty review.192
no underlying performance precedes the initial transmission—the telecast itself is the only
copyrighted work.”).
188. Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, supra note 79, at 24 n.6.
189. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
190. The specter of a Takings Clause issue is not an academic hypothetical, as it was raised
during Congressional hearings about amending PASPA to ban betting on college sports
nationwide, with no exceptions. S. REP. NO. 107-16, at 18 (2001) (“S. 718’s prohibition on state
regulated college sports wagering without compensation violates the Takings Clause.”).
191. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013).
192. In Christie I, the Third Circuit cited City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 420 U.S. 297 (1976),
and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981), for the proposition that
grandfathering schemes in economic legislation were permissible. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 239–40
(3d Cir. 2013). The Third Circuit’s analysis was dismissive of New Jersey’s contention that PASPA
is distinct because the PASPA grandfathering scheme is permanent instead of temporary like the
grandfathering scheme in Dukes. The court stated that the state was misguided because there was
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CONCLUSION
With Shelby County establishing the equal sovereignty doctrine as
a “fundamental principle” of constitutional law,193 its role in the current
PASPA lawsuit involving New Jersey is important. But its impact in
future PASPA litigation involving other disfavored states that want to
permit (or ban) sports betting may be even more meaningful. Indeed,
counsel for the Plaintiff Sports Leagues foreshadowed the possibility
of imminent litigation in this area during oral argument: “[O]n behalf
of my clients, I’m really trying to prohibit, you know, prevent there
from being a Christie III.”194 Absent Congressional repeal or
amendment,195 the next PASPA lawsuit seems inevitable. No fewer
than six other states have introduced sports betting legislation.196 Even
New Jersey has “full nuclear” legislation proposed that would
completely repeal the state’s sports betting prohibitions.197 Such a
complete repeal would result in unregulated—yet legal—sports betting
everywhere in the Garden State.

no indication that the Dukes scheme was temporary. Id. The Third Circuit, however, is incorrect
as Dukes’ grandfathering scheme would end when the last pushcart vendor of New Orleans either
traded in her pushcart for retirement, sought another job, or died. Similarly, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Clover Leaf Creamery involved a scheme that was narrowly designed to affect one
particular type of dairy container that the Minnesota legislature determined to pose an
environmental burden on the state. While the case references “grandfathered” paper-based
containers, the loose use of the term grandfathering is quite different than in PASPA, as the
Minnesota statute banned the sale of milk in a particular type of plastic container, it did not ban
the sale of milk in all containers. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 458–60
(1981). In order for PASPA to be properly analogous to Clover Leaf Creamery and justify the
Third Circuit’s conclusion, Congress would have had to propose a scheme making sports betting
impermissible at casinos, but freely available at locations where lottery tickets are sold. By
analogy to the subject matter of Clover Leaf Creamery, a PASPA-like scheme would ban the sale
of milk in certain plastic containers, but allow nine stores throughout the state of Minnesota to
continue selling milk in the otherwise banned plastic containers.
193. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623.
194. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 41 (three judge panel).
195. Congress is currently undertaking a review of federal sports gambling laws. See David
Purdum, Congress Reviewing ‘Obsolete’ Federal Gambling Laws, To Introduce New Legislation,
ESPN.COM (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/17848529/congressionalcommittee-reviews-federal-gambling-laws-plans-introduce-new-legislation [https://perma.cc/A95
2-RAZB].
196. Dustin Gouker, If Other States Want to Challenge Federal Law on Sports Betting, Now
Might Be a Good Time, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/
12713/challenges-to-us-sports-betting-law/ [https://perma.cc/J2KE-MH8T]; see also Gouker,
Legislative Tracker, supra note 159.
197. David Purdum, New Jersey to Continue Fight for Sports Betting, ESPN.COM (Nov. 1,
2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/17945197/chalk-new-jersey-continues-fight-legalizesports-betting [https://perma.cc/LJ6X-KUM5].
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According to Professor Colby, “PASPA contravenes the principle
of equal state sovereignty.”198 We agree. Like Professor Colby, we find
PASPA’s partial and non-uniform ban on state-sponsored sports
wagering to run afoul of the equal sovereignty doctrine’s general
constraints as set forth in Shelby County and Northwest Austin. PASPA
also fails equal sovereignty scrutiny for two other narrower reasons.
First, for a law motivated to address a “national problem” with no
geographic borders, PASPA’s various carve-outs for no fewer than
nine states are irrational. Not only does the discrimination manifest
itself between grandfathered states and non-grandfathered states, but
there is also an unconstitutional differentiation between Nevada and
the other exempt states. Second, PASPA’s grandfathered exceptions
are perpetual in nature, making them more suspect than the temporary
provisions of the Voting Rights Act ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in Shelby County. If the equal sovereignty question is
presented to the Supreme Court in the current Christie II litigation or
a later sports gambling-specific dispute, Professor Colby—and Justice
Ginsburg—will likely be proven correct in questioning the validity of
PASPA.199 However, the appropriate remedy would be to sever out
§ 3704’s differential grandfather clause, not eviscerate § 3702’s blanket
ban. Such a remedy would be an unwelcome result for New Jersey and
Nevada, but a correct application of the equal sovereignty doctrine visà-vis PASPA.

198. Colby, supra note 2, at 1155; see also Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
199. Likewise, Justice Stevens will be validated in flagging the “obscured Congressional
purposes” underpinning PASPA’s exemptions. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999).

